The setup is attractive: tight PJM capacity plus a bigger, more efficient gas fleet can lift cash generation. The swing factor is whether TLN can convert scarcity into durable contracts before market rules or new supply compress margins.

TLN is a scarce PJM “clean-firm + dispatchable” platform: if it locks in multi-site hyperscaler-style contracts while keeping enough merchant torque, it can compound FCF/share through 2031 via capacity scarcity, best-in-class gas additions, and disciplined capital returns—despite elevated regulatory/political risk.

Compute growth makes reliable, deliverable MWh a strategic bottleneck; TLN is positioned in PJM with nuclear + efficient gas and contracting capability, but remains exposed to market design and politics.

TLN’s non-linear upside is not “more megawatts,” it’s turning PJM tightness into bankable, premium cash flows: (1) higher capacity revenue visibility from record-clearing auctions, (2) post-acquisition dispatch/heat-rate optimization of modern CCGTs, and (3) productized large-load contracting (SLAs, congestion-aware delivery, clean-firm bundles). If TLN improves cash-flow quality (less pure merchant, more contracted) while keeping outage performance high at Susquehanna, the market can sustain an infrastructure-like cash flow valuation rather than a mid-cycle merchant multiple.

The main risk is political/regulatory: record PJM capacity outcomes can trigger caps, rule redesign, or forced consumer relief that directly hits TLN’s margin stack. Second is timing: even if hyperscaler demand is committed, transmission/interconnection delays can shift the monetization window beyond the 5-year horizon. Third is leverage + operations: nuclear outages or integration issues at newly acquired gas assets would be amplified by higher debt and a more crowded competitive set of “AI power” consolidators.

Thesis unchanged; updated to reflect Freedom/Guernsey close and an operating model more explicitly oriented toward large-load commercialization.

Slightly tempered to reflect higher post-close leverage and the growing probability of policy intervention as capacity costs hit consumers.

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